RONALD D. ROTUNDA
Frank views both from Iraqis and non-Iraqis
On June 28, 2004, US Administrator L. Paul Bremer formally handed over power to an interim Iraqi government. The brief ceremony, held with only a handful of participants, took place two days in advance of the official handover date because of security concerns. Iraqi's newly appointed Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and a 33-member cabinet face the daunting task of forging a new, democratic, secular Iraq.
In late March 2004, the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute and Bilkent University, a private university in Ankara, hosted a conference titled Iraq on the Way to its New Constitution. About half of the 25 participants were from Iraq, including a few members of the Constitutional Committee involved with Iraqi's draft constitution. Other participants included professors from Iraqi universities, and representatives of the country's private, nongovernmental organizations. Most of the other conference participants were from Turkey, representing both the government foreign ministry and academics involved in foreign policy, including Seyfi Tashan, the director of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute; former Turkish ambassadors Yuksel Soylemez and Dr. Ali Karaosmanoglu; Professor Ali Dogramaci, the rector of Bilkent University; and the Honorable Abdullab Gul, the deputy prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs. I was one of two American lawyers invited to participate.
Some six months after this conference, and just three months into the new Iraqi democracy, what the conference participants foretold has come to pass: the Iraqi people are weary of war. Polls of Iraqis show a solid majority think their living conditions have improved and expect the future to be brighter still. But the road to peace is a long one and the incline is not downhill.When the conference concluded, the views of some of the Iraqi participants gave reason to dampen any optimism as to the future of Iraq and democracy in that troubled region of the world.
Now, the outlook actually is more positive. An increasingly larger number of Iraqis are in charge of security and they are attacking terrorists even when they hide in mosques. People who are residents in Iraq have expressed optimism to me. A scholar who lived in Iraq for seven months now says that he is "bullish on Iraq." Some of the most violent terrorists, those who specialize in beheadings, are foreigners who come from outside the country. And there are all the things that could have happened but did not: the oil wells have survived sabotage attempts; the Kurdish region has not broken off from the south, and that area is functioning in a fairly normal way; the efforts of Moqtada al-Sadr to spark war between the Shias and Sunnis has not come to pass; and the suicide car bombings, which serve no military purpose, are acts signaling growing desperation on the part of the terrorists.
A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES...
This was not my first trip to Turkey, as I had visited Istanbul over 20 years ago as a Fulbright lecturer. In 2004, the signs of modernization were everywhere: gleaming flush toilets; satellite dishes perched on the most modest of homes; and huge electric signs advertising Burger King, Toys "R" Us, and other American brands. In Turkey, like just about any other foreign country, most things exude Americanism—American goods, American music, the American language. Many Turks speak English, and the American dollar is widely accepted.
There were ample reminders that Turkey remains a developing nation, however. The Turkish lira has been so devalued that one US dollar was worth 1,350,000 Turkish liras at the time. As of January 1, 2005, in fact, six zeroes will be eliminated when the country adopts the "New Turkish Lira." Chronic energy shortages, also common in other developing countries, mean there are few street lights, and those lights that exist are lit by lowwatt bulbs. The hotels have mandatory electricity conservation measures in place. For example, the lights in each room work only when the guest's key is placed in a special outlet. Once the room key is removed and the occupant leaves the room, there is no electricity in the room.
The journey of the conference participants from Iraq reflected the harsh life they were leaving behind, if only for a few days. While other foreign participants flew in luxury to Ankara, they had spent 18 hours traveling from Baghdad by bus. They could not risk flying out of Baghdad, as the airport was considered at risk for SAM missile attacks.
..AND SHARED ISSUES
Once the conference began, one of the first discussions concerned the Kurds. Turkey shares a common border with northern Iraq and a shared concern over the 25 million Kurds who live in the stateless region known as Kurdistan¡ªa region that ranges across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.While some Turks referred to those living in northern Iraq as "our Kurdish brothers and sisters" others were fearful that an independent Kurdistan might seek territorial expansion into presentday Turkey. They also wanted protection for Turkish-speaking Iraqis, and were concerned that the Kurds in Iraq would be unsympathetic to their plight. Turks and Kurds have a history of not getting along, and Turkey has not always been compassionate to the estimated 12 million ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey
The Turkish Foreign Policy Institute has been in existence for many years, but Bilkent University, the other host, is a relatively young university founded in 1984. Bilkent University had a special interest in issues relating to the Kurdish people. The university's founder, 89-year-old Ihsan Dogramaci, was born a Turk within the borders of what is now modern-day Iraq. Dogramaci had to leave Iraq because of discrimination against the Turks, and remains committed to finding a way for Turkey to live at peace with both Iraq and the Kurds.
The non-Kurdish Iraqi participants wanted the central government to control the oil in northern Iraq to discourage Kurdish secession. The draft constitution provides that "the natural resources of Iraqi" belong "to all the people of all the regions" of Iraq. One Iraqi participant "an Islamic fundamentalist who opposed women's rights and argued that"all of the problems of Iraq are caused by the American troops"— was vehement that the Iraqi central government, and not the new Kurdistan regional government, should retain control over the northern oil fields in order to keep Iraq whole.
The Iraqi fundamentalists and the secular Turks disagreed on many things, but not about this issue. A Turkish participant quickly concurred that the central government's control of the oil wealth will make it less likely that the Kurds would seek to leave Iraq and create their own state.
I responded that the citizens of Iraq should own the means of production—not in a Marxist sense, where it is really the politicians who own the companies—but in the capitalist sense, where the people own the shares directly. The new Iraqi government could create 10 oil companies, each with oil wells throughout the state. The government could then distribute shares of each of these companies to each Iraqi citizen. Because the citizens are not used to capitalism, the government might impose a few restrictions, such as forbidding Iraqis from selling the shares for a certain number of years. Eventually, however, these shares should be fully marketable, so that any Iraqi could choose to use these shares to raise capital to open up a business or to establish some other commercial operation.
These newly created oil companies could start paying dividends immediately and begin pumping money into the economy. The Iraqi people would begin to understand the meaning of capitalism. Because each oil company will own oil wells throughout the country, citizens in the south would have an economic interest in the northern oil fields remaining stable and prosperous. The opposite also would be true, as economic interdependence would help promote peace.
Under this system, the Iraqi government could raise the funds it needs for operating expenses by imposing a withholding tax on the dividends. In this way, the people would understand both the role government plays in providing services and the responsibilities of each citizen to help finance these services. The Iraqi government should secure its funds the way other capitalist governments raise money, i.e., taxes, not by running a monopoly.
One conference participant said that I was "flamboyant" and "colorful." I asked if he was talking about my bright pink bowtie. "That too," he said, "but I'm really talking about your proposal." Another said that it just could not happen. Yet another Iraqi said, "How could the people own the wells if they do not already own the wells?" Margaret Thatcher found a way to accomplish this goal in the United Kingdom. The government simply can create the shares and distribute them, giving them away to the people to own directly.
The reaction to my proposal suggests, unfortunately, that many Iraqis do not understand how a market economy can make ordinary Iraqis much better off than they ever were under Saddam Hussein's regime. If the Iraqis do not comprehend capitalism, they cannot become capitalists, just as they cannot be democrats if they do not understand minority rights. Giving shares to the people will accomplish the first important step in understanding how a market economy works and the benefits it can offer. It also will give them an economic stake in a peaceful, unified Iraq.
Other exchanges gave me reason to be pessimistic about the future of Iraq. A Kurdish-speaking participant privately told me that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a leading religious figure in Iraq, really is a moderate and rejects Irani's theory of clerical rule. He was convinced that al-Sistani likely would be assassinated by one of his enemies, possibly by another cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. Several weeks after the conference, in fact, the Iraqi Coalition Authority announced that it would execute a months-old arrest warrant for al-Sadr for the murder of a rival cleric in 2003. Neither the United States nor Iraq has captured al-Sadr, but he has not become a popular figure, while al-Sistani, by the strength of his reputation and personality, has become more powerful. He exercised a crucial role in brokering an end of the violence in Najaf in the summer of 2004, and he rejects the Iranian model of a theocracy. He does not endorse an official governmental role for Islamic clerics.
Many of the conference members (with the benefit of hindsight) thought it was a mistake for the United States to disband the Iraqi army so quickly. This policy meant that, all at once, about 400,000 heavily armed people were out of work. They had every incentive to sell themselves and their weapons to the highest bidder.
Several speakers argued that the United States appeared to encourage sectarianism by labeling people in certain groups such as Sunnis, Shia, Kurds, and Turkmen. There are Sunnis, for example, who are Islamic fundamentalists, while other Sunnis are not observant Muslims and think of themselves foremost as doctors, or lawyers, or something else. They had a point—why encourage people to think of themselves as belonging to groups with little common interest in each other except for their religion and ethnic origins? The new government must instill in citizens a sense of being first and foremost Iraqi in a new Iraqi democracy.
A few weeks after the conference ended, US Administrator Bremer asked Iraq's Interior Minister Nuri al-Badran, a Shiite Muslim who is in charge of security forces, to resign from the interim government because he is a Shia. Bremer said that the defense minister also is Shia and said that he wanted to maintain a balance of Iraq's religious groups on the cabinet. Al-Badran quoted Bremer as telling him: "That will cause an imbalance, and we in the coalition cannot accept that. The solution is for you to step down from your position." Several Iraqi participants at the conference would disagree strongly with Bremer's decision, and perhaps they are right.
US officials picked the Iraqi Governing Council based in large part on ethnic and religious affiliations. For example, one Turkmen was picked because he is a Turkmen. Several Turks at the conference thought that there should be two Turkmen. When Iraq holds open and free elections in 2005, the Iraqi people will make these decisions for themselves.
WHO LIVES IN IRAQ?
Oddly enough, no one in the West, or in Iraq for that matter, has many hard facts about the demographics of Iraq. The last complete census was taken about 50 years ago. As of mid-2003, there were an estimated 24.2 million Iraqis. How many of these are Kurds or Turkmen? The estimates range from a few hundred thousand Turkmen to over 2 million, though many ethnic Turks, over the course of the last 50 years, have stopped using their Turkish language and given up their Turkish identities. There are an estimated 5-6 million Kurds in Iraq, most of whom are Sunni Muslims.
When Iraq conducts a new census, should the census questionnaire even ask people their religion or language of preference? If the basis for representation in a modern democracy is the number of adults voting (one person, one vote), why ask people if they are Muslim, and, if so, what kind, and whether the person actually attends the mosque weekly? We can give people the right to vote without ever knowing their ethnic background or religious preferences. The purported leaders of the various factions want to know how many people are in"their group''but that does not mean that the new government must comply with their parochial interests.
It is estimated that about 47 percent of the people in Iraq are under18 years of age. If the transition to democracy is successful and that is a big two "if"d ecades from now the great majority of the country will have known only democracy as a form of government.
And there were other glimmers of hope throughout the course of the conference. One of the Iraqis attending the conference lives in Baghdad but has a US visa. He could leave Iraq whenever he wants. He told me that he follows American television and that life in Baghdad is much better and less violent than the US media portrays it. He was optimistic about the long-term outlook for peace in Iraq, and thought that the American media is too pessimistic.
While the comments of some of the other Iraqis at the conference suggest that the road to a peaceful, secular democracy that respects minority rights will be long and arduous, it is too early to reach a conclusion on the future of Iraqi democracy. On the one hand, there are certainly some reasons to believe that peaceful solutions are possible in the region. Saddam Hussein is now in prison, and both Iraq and Afghanistan have been liberated by a foreign military that seeks no booty or tribute. Libya is making gestures that seem designed to make it appear more moderate to the world stage. Oman has broadened its voting rights and Qatar has a new constitution.
On the other hand, some of the Iraqi conference participants wanted no role for women. The draft constitution says that women are equal, but they are not equal in the eyes of these fundamentalists, who were not shy about expressing their opinion. Some speakers clearly did not believe in minority rights. If the majority agrees to something, why, in their view, should a minority be able to stop action that discriminates against the minority.
Several of the participants, expressing aspirations of pan-Arabic glory, wanted Iraq to be part of a greater "Arab State," but those desires made the ethnic Kurds and ethnic Turks feel insecure. One participant went further and wanted to impose Islamic law. Those speakers who participated in the conference and who opposed a modern democratic state learned, at the least, that people can disagree without being disagreeable. The conference can claim this very modest success, but Iraq will need more than that to survive.
POSTSCRIPT
In the months since this trip, there have been moments to think that the new government in Iraq is off to a hopeful future, and moments to believe that the fledgling democracy is in for a rough ride. The goal is that Iraq will follow in Turkey's footsteps, taking a long (if not always smooth) path toward both modernization and democracy. Is there a Kemal Ataturk, or even a George Washington figure, about to emerge in Iraq? Is there a core group of secular, non-fundamentalist Iraqis able to bring about a peaceful transition? Will Iraqi's draft permanent constitution, to be completed by August 15, 2005, provide the necessary blueprints for democracy?
Turkey today is a Muslim nation that has become an officially secular country,with many different ethnicities under one rule.How secular? I thought that I would buy a Koran as a souvenir of my journey, but I could not find any and was told that I would have more luck finding one in Washington, DC, than in Ankara. The Ankara skyline is dotted with mosques and people may call themselves Muslim, but that does not mean that they wish to dictate religious observance to nonbelievers. To be sure, the country continues to have its share of political and economic crises, and has deep-seeded ethnic conflicts. But Turkey also has had a democratic constitution since 1982, and was able to ease out of decades of martial law. And, after 15 years of waiting, Turkey now appears on track to be approved as the newest (and only Islamic) member of the European Union.
It may be possible, with a little faith in the democratic process, to believe that a secure and stable Iraq may evolve in the not-too-distant future. Before World War II, Japan was a militaristic empire full of suicide bombers called Kamikazes. The United States gave Japan a secular democracy that is pacifistic to boot. If we can do the same for Iraq, we will change the history of the world. It will not happen overnight, but the Japanese experiment shows that it can be done.
Ronald D. Rotunda (CC '03) is the George Mason University Foundation professor of law, George Mason University School of Law.
![[back]](images/left.gif){kind=small}
Return to COSMOS 2004 Table of Contents
Return to COSMOS Journals
Return to COSMOS Home Page