THE INTERPLAY OF CULTURES

WILLIAM WATTS

Whither the United States in the world

September 11, 2001, opened a new era. For the American people, the tragic events of that day engendered a huge outpouring of patriotism and community spirit. Those events have also thrust the United States into a role nobody had foreseen, and certainly not President George W. Bush. In determining that the central mission of his term in office would be a “war on terrorism,” Bush has transformed the global landscape, and sharply recast the position of the United States on that terrain.

The implications of this shift are staggering. For better or worse, the United States stands today in a position of unparalleled military and economic power. In a world suffering from stagnant economic growth, the American economy has shown a resilience that has confounded the skeptics.While earlier signs of quick recovery have faded, the fundamentals remain in place. The world continues to look to America as the leading engine of growth.

At the same time, US military might has achieved a level of superiority that has left the rest of the world in its wake. The latest budget increases mean the United States soon will surpass the defense spending of all the rest of the world put together.At $396.1 billion, the 2003 US defense budget is six times Russia’s, and 26 times the total of all seven “rogue states”—North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. The combined defense budgets of the NATO countries, Russia, China, Japan, India, Australia, and the Republic of Korea come to $322 billion, $74 billion less than the United States plans to spend. The United States will reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile, but is developing a new generation of nuclear weapons that have much greater accuracy and penetration. The overall sophistication of US conventional and nuclear weaponry is the marvel, the envy— and the fear—of friend and foe alike.

America’s economic and military prowess is abundantly clear; what we should do with this clout is not. Both at home and abroad, many have voiced concerns over American unilateralism, and at the strong rhetoric in President Bush’s speeches. The President’s comments that “I will not wait on events, while dangers gather” or his declaration that “Evil is evil, and it must be opposed” prompt worries that the United States may try to fight terrorism singlehandedly, if necessary. Such comments provoke a wave of concern at home about global stability, matched by a rising tide of anti-Americanism abroad.

IT’S LONELY AT THE TOP

Over the next 20-30 years, it is difficult to predict which nation states will be able to present a serious challenge to the military and economic superiority of the United States. One can speculate on the growing role of China and India, and perhaps a more cohesive European Union. Russia will continue to seek its place in the sun. But the military gap that now exists is likely to grow,whetted by increasing US defense expenditures. The resilient US economy strengthens that degree of superiority.

History, of course, suggests otherwise. Dominant forces invariably generate challenges. Current US preeminence will surely attract its opponents. As Joseph Nye argues cogently in The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, there are many dimensions and levels of might, reaching far beyond simple military and economic strength. Other areas of “soft power,” as Nye puts it, can thwart the singular supremacy now resting in American hands. At some point, the balance is sure to shift. The historical face-off among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government has been a singular strength of our democratic system. Such a balance is now lacking in the international arena. Increasingly, nations around the world, friend and foe alike, are concerned about this imbalance.

A number of indicators attest to these concerns, and the nervous assessments of what the virtually unprecedented US dominance means to other nations. A quick look at how other countries view the United States and its foreign policy can help put this into some context.

Japan—A few years ago, it would have seemed absurd to suggest that Japan might be on the path to becoming the Great Britain of Asia, fallen from an earlier dominant perch to a quasi-supporting role on the world stage. A decade of economic stagnation, marked by ominous cracks in the banking system, political ineptness, and indecisive leadership, has cast the island nation in a sharply different light. Japan also faces the prospect of a rapidly aging population, which will only add to the country’s ongoing economic plight. In the absence of a social security safety net, Japan’s high personal savings rate is for many the retirement mainstay. Paradoxically, that savings rate has helped Japan weather its years of economic stagnation, providing a false sense of prosperity that has resulted in little public pressure to force the government to deal with the problems at hand.

Japan did respond quickly to the events of September 11. Prime Minister Koizumi was one of the first foreign leaders to come to Washington and lend support to the nascent Bush anti-terrorism effort. Unlike Japan’s slow response during the GulfWar, this time Koizumi and the Japanese Diet acted with remarkable and surprising speed. A combination of non-combat naval support, intelligence sharing, aid assistance, and other commitments was warmly welcomed in Washington.

Japan now may have the opportunity to play a special “bridging” role, if it has the will and imagination to do so.Heavily dependent on Middle East oil, Japan has kept its lines open to Iran and other Middle Eastern nations. Japan, with varying levels of trust in both worlds, may have an intermediary role to play between the United States and the Middle East. Koizimi’s venturesome trip to North Korea in September, which may open new negotiating tracks in the region, hints at this possibility. Conversely, Japan may find itself tied by its absolute necessity to keep the Mideast oil flowing. Devising a course that will satisfy Japanese policy constraints and domestic political realities, while balancing Tokyo’s alliances with the United States and Middle Eastern links, could prove impossible. In a worst-case scenario, according to Yukio Okamoto, a senior Japanese diplomat, Japan could turn to “armed or unarmed neutrality.” As the Bush Administration’s war on terrorism continues and unfolds, pressures on Japan to play a supportive role are likely to increase. The domestic anguish in Japan that such pressure will encourage is almost sure to put additional strains on the bilateral relationship.

Korea—President Bush’s inclusion of North Korea in his “axis of evil” has not played well on the Korean peninsula. South Korea has become a burgeoning economic powerhouse, increasingly self-confident and eager to play a larger role in Northeast Asia and beyond.Not unexpectedly, this growth and maturation have led to critically revised attitudes toward the United States. These altered views will pose problems for American policy makers and US policy interests.

In December 2001, I directed a survey project in South Korea, recording the views of 51 Korean citizens aged 30-49, identified as showing promise of assuming future positions of leadership.When asked to pinpoint the “biggest problems in relations with the United States,” respondents voiced a wide-ranging litany of complaints. They were very critical of American unilateralism, arrogance, cultural insensitivity, and interventionism. Many were critical of their own government’s dependence on the ubiquitous US military and economic presence. A near-majority believed anti- Americanism was on the rise, blaming a US “superpower attitude” and the hard-line Bush policy on North Korea. Developments subsequent to this survey, including the tragic killing of two young Korean girls by a US military vehicle, have added fuel to the fire.

The breadth of negative views is worrisome. It reflects a panorama of critical attitudes and perceptions that is corrosive to the best interests of both sides. Three out of four participants favored only limited support to the Bush Administration’s war on terrorism, specifically not to include military involvement. Only 15 percent were in favor of giving full support, including military involvement. North Korea’s subsequent acknowledgment of a clandestine nuclear weapons program has strengthened the hands of critics of the north. The Korean citizens we interviewed find a lot lacking, both on the home front and in relations with their key ally, the United States.

These Koreans perceive they are being relegated to a second-class citizen status, subject to the whims of a “Pax Americana,” and forced to play second fiddle to Japan. This growing anti- Americanism will put new strains on the US-Korean bilateral relationship. It also makes more tempting the playing, by disillusioned voices, of a “China card.”

China—When two of the largest and most populous nations see each other through the prism of erroneous stereotypes, miscues can be dangerous.Most Americans view China as a “monolith,” where 1.3 billion Chinese march shoulder-to-shoulder, doing whatever the Communist Party asks. Anyone traveling for an extended period of time in China quickly learns that individual Chinese have differing views and agendas, all of which place heavy burdens on the Chinese leadership.

Many Chinese have an equally stereotyped view of the United States. The United States is the “hegemon,” the global superpower that acts as a bully, wants its own way, and pressures everyone to get in line. The United States also is seen as arbitrary and hypocritical for pressing human rights as a foreign policy issue while overlooking human rights at home. The United States intervenes in Kosovo and Iraq, but ignores massacres in Rwanda because that is not in its interest.

The 1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade presents a disturbing example of the Chinese view of “America the hegemon.” Many in China are convinced that the United States deliberately bombed the Chinese embassy in retaliation for Beijing’s condemnation of the US bombing campaign in Kosovo. They also scoff at the explanation that the bombing was an error, saying that American technological prowess refutes any such excuse.

China has felt threatened throughout its history by outsiders and foreign predators. It remains adamant that Taiwan be reunited with the mainland, and that the Dalai Lama not be allowed to encourage the emergence of an independent Tibet. The leadership’s worry about Falun Gong, which it condemns as a dangerous sect whose members are deceived by their leader (resident in the United States), reflects a larger concern about separatism as well as fear of an alternative belief system that challenges the regime’s concern with unity.

Beijing has exhibited growing concern about Muslim separatists in the western region of Xinjiang and the potential spillover of Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Central Asian states. It came, then, as no surprise that PRC President Jiang Zemin quickly expressed support for President Bush’s “war on terrorism,” eagerly espousing a cause that provided him with welcome domestic leverage.

As China engages more actively in the war against terrorism, and threads its way through myriad new commitments that are the price of joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), we would be well advised to keep this mind-set in clear focus. Serious domestic problems will challenge the Chinese leadership. WTO accession will entail difficult economic decisions. Inefficient state enterprises will be forced to shut down, adding to the millions already unemployed. Foreign agricultural imports will place new strains on China’s farm workers, who already earn far less than their urban cousins.

The demands inherent in these pressures will condition how the Chinese leadership deals with the outside world. The problems are weighty—some would argue even regime-threatening. China’s leaders will be especially sensitive to outside actions that could be perceived as adding to, or trying to take advantage of, these pressures and problems. Smoothing a path for China’s acceptance into the global market system, while maintaining the necessary safeguards against either destabilizing Chinese leadership or encouraging it into rash actions, poses a supreme challenge to global diplomacy in the new millennium.

The World of Islam—Despite the fact that Muslims comprise the second-largest religious group on the planet, with some 6,000,000 members in the United States, the world of Islam has remained off the radar screen for most Americans. September 11 changed all that, and started a process of opening American eyes to a dimly understood phenomenon: Islamic extremism.

The big question, of course, is why Islamic extremists hate Americans with such vehemence. A major Gallup Organization survey, carried out in December 2001 and January 2002, helps shed some light on Muslim views of America. Following the September 11 events, Gallup conducted nearly 10,000 in-depth personal interviews in nine predominantly Muslim countries: Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. (Several countries with large Muslim populations were not surveyed, including Egypt, India, Bangladesh, and Nigeria.)

Overall, as Gallup reported, “at almost every opportunity ... respondents overwhelmingly agreed that the United States is aptly described by such negative labels as ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily provoked, biased. There was overwhelming disagreement with statements that the West and the United States are trustworthy, are friendly, care about poorer nations, or are willing to share technology.” In addition, Gallup noted, most survey respondents “... also believe that Western nations do not respect Arab or Islamic values, do not support Arab causes, and do not exhibit fairness toward Arabs, Muslims, or, in particular, the situation in Palestine.” Interestingly, a separate sampling of Americans found that a substantial majority saw US favoritism toward Israel as the major cause of negative Muslim views about the United States.

In all nine countries surveyed, at least a plurality believed their “own value system is being influenced negatively by the value system that prevails in the Western societies.” Immoral lifestyles, weakened family structure, and declining social courtesy and deference to elders were cited frequently as Western shortcomings. Only in Turkey did a plurality believe that “Western societies care about co-existing with the Islamic/Arab worlds.” Clear majorities in Jordan and Lebanon held a negative view, while substantial pluralities were of that opinion in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait, and Pakistan.

Majorities in seven of the nine countries surveyed by Gallup said that US military action against Afghanistan was “morally unjustifiable”—“totally unjustifiable” was the majority view in Lebanon, Kuwait, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Morocco. (Gallup was not permitted to ask this question in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.)

Majorities in Indonesia, Turkey, Morocco, Lebanon, Iran, and Pakistan, along with a bare plurality in Kuwait, also considered the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon to be “morally unjustifiable.” At the same time, large majorities in Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, and Lebanon (in declining order) rejected the proposition that “groups of Arabs carried out the attacks.” Those who denied participation by Arabs blamed al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden; the United States itself; Israel; or non-Muslim terrorists.

Not all views about the West, and especially the United States, were negative. American/Western technological prowess was widely acknowledged and respected, as were the economic prosperity and the democratic freedoms shared by Americans and others in the West. Age differentials also came into play. Except for Pakistan, younger respondents (under 30 years of age) tended to have a more favorable opinion of the United States than those over 40. In Lebanon, Turkey, Morocco, and Jordan, majorities associated Western nations with treating their own citizens equally.

There is something of a mirrored set of perceptions at work here. Many Americans surveyed by Gallup tended to have negative views of the nine Muslim countries. When asked, in March 2002, whether they had favorable or unfavorable attitudes about Muslim countries in general, only 21 percent of the US survey participants responded positively, while 41 percent were in the negative column. Highly unfavorable balances prevailed in the cases of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and (most of all) Iran, where memories of the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the ensuing hostage crisis apparently linger on.

These responses suggest a huge perception gap between different cultures and world views.Many (perhaps most) in the Muslim world share a deep animus against aspects of the West and Western policies, especially the United States as the leading Western nation. Many in the Muslim world, as in China and Korea, see the United States as a great power flushed with hubris, exceeding its proper limits, and assuming a hegemonic mentality. The gap will not be bridged easily.

WHITHER AMERICA?

The “war on terrorism” has come to be seen as the single driving force behind virtually all the foreign policy decisions of the Bush Administration. The United States runs the risk of alienating the very nations and centers of power it needs to have on its side in this lengthy and murky battle.Any effort to form a working coalition in this struggle is weakened when America’s position is seen as one-sided, insensitive to divergent views, and insistent on having its own way. If the United States is to succeed in controlling, if not eradicating, international terrorism, it is going to need a lot of help. Going beyond the obvious strengths in America’s arsenal—economic and military prowess, a creative and resilient populace, remarkably solid democratic institutions, and a law-based system which most Americans accept and respect—there are other assets on which to build, and alliances to be forged.

Dealing with an al Qaeda-type adversary will require a range of tools: sharing intelligence; disrupting money flows; tracking movements of individuals; discovering and foiling planning and operations and military training camps; dirty tricks; subterfuge; and much more. Even as potent a superpower as the United States cannot do all this alone, though unilateral action may, at times, be necessary. Without the assistance of others, and the development of a superbly coordinated and internally trustworthy global network, success in such an endeavor cannot easily be assumed.

William Watts (CC ’84) is president of Potomac Associates, a foreign policy research organization in Washington, DC. He served in the US Foreign Service in Washington, DC; Seoul, Korea; Oberammergau, Germany; and Moscow, USSR.Watts also served in the White House as staff secretary and senior staff member of the National Security Council.

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