EDITORIAL

GEORGE  S. ROBINSON

Human rights and rebus sic stantibus

“...a tacit condition, said to attach to all treaties, that they shall cease to be obligatory so soon as
the state of facts and conditions upon which they were founded has substantially changed.”

The vital components of what it means to be human are being subjected to increasingly rapid and accumulative changes. Although endless scholarly considerations have been published on the subject of “human rights,” the current status of evolving biotechnology and even virtual reality necessitates constant review and reassessment of what constitutes not only a “right,” but even how we define “human.” Although subject matter for a future issue of the COSMOS Journal, perhaps, relevant words like “life,” “sentient,” and “sapient” should be examined with respect to their immutable, defining characteristics.

Breeding patterns of humans have created a species that currently is incredibly uniform genetically. Because of this minimal genetic diversity, it has been comparatively easy to agree who is human and, therefore, what “inherent rights” exist that can be applied uniformly to all human “specimens.”

Some of the articles in COSMOS 2001 address issues related to human rights, both nationally and globally. In the past, passion in arguing the existence of such rights often has been accomplished with little or no regard for precise definitions and consistency in their uses. And that has led frequently to irritating obfuscations of the real issues inherent in thinking about human rights amidst the biotechnological blurring of traditional boundaries. In fact, reference to “human rights” often has been so undisciplined of late as to render the term all too frequently little more than a rhetorical device for political purposes and a justification for certain law enforcement activities purporting to protect those universal rights.

So, just what is “human,” and how do we, or should we, define “human rights?” How do we define those or similar “rights” to cover all biotechnologically changed members of humankind? Some researchers are looking at the lateral transfer of certain genes from one animal species that might be helpful for long-duration adaptation by astronauts to a space habitat ambiance, such as the International Space Station. Albeit crudely, scientists from the Max Planck Institute for Biochemistry in Germany have linked several brain cells from a snail with silicon chips to create a living-mechanical electronic circuit. At the very least, the implications for human-machine intelligence and accumulative changes to taxonomic characterizations of Homo sapiens sapiens are very interesting.

Clearly, we are at the unnerving point in the evolution of humankind whereby we seem to be starting to direct our evolution by our own hands. We already have cloned and genetically altered other components of the animal and plant kingdoms. Why not ourselves, prohibitive legislative attempts to the contrary notwithstanding? Are we anywhere near prepared to handle with insight and wisdom these immensely complex problems that science is placing in our laps? Is President Bush, for example, being properly cautious in his approach to the issue of stem cell research and production, if for no other reason than to allow the public adequate time to contemplate knowledgeably the vast array of related and intertwined issues, publicly debate them, and make genuinely informed decisions?

Isn’t it reasonable to prepare fully for the consequences of scientific disciplines that may well alter our traditional definitions of the essence of being human... and, in turn, likely will lead to changing definitions of “human rights?” These evolving characteristics may well alter the foundations, the core principles, of “nature” or “natural law” upon which civilizations, cultures, and bioecological dictates have stood and evolved. So much of the current debate about human rights makes the assumption that such rights can only be ascribed to individuals. But does the body politic possess a comprehensive human rights guardianship on behalf of individuals? Making these distinctions can be critical to investigating the relevant issues regarding the current validity of what characterizes prevailing human rights...and how they are, or ought to be, enforced.

Change, uncertainty, and confusion can be seen as reflections in any “mirror” held up to capture the images of individuals, societies, and transnational cultures trying to come to grips with the effects of evolving high technology on the immutable essence of humankind, itself. Politics, economics and other cultural characteristics, whole civilizations, and even ideologies and theologies are constantly pressing the leading edges of social and biological change when the catalyst is a vast array of rapidly evolving technologies directed at human biocultural transformations.

The Age of Enlightenment was awash with much talk about human rights and the redefinitions brought about by the results of scientific methodology and research. These rights were anchored by the prevailing concept of jus naturale, or Natural Law Theory (something the Roman jurists of the Antonine Age speculated was a system of rules for the guidance of human conduct that grew out of and conformed to the individual’s shared nature, or his/her whole mental, moral, and physical constitution). But human rights actually represented something rather less ephemeral than even the later definitions appearing in such documents as Virginia’s 1776 Declaration of Rights, France’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the 1791 ratification of a Bill of Rights for the Constitution of the United States. These documents were intended to reflect certain abiding rights illuminated by the melding of physical, or natural, and moral sciences.

But are the prevailing international treaties and conventions addressing the subject of “global human rights” in any realistic way deriving from and shaped by current scientific methodology and resulting empirical data? Therein lies much of the problem of understanding the interactions between the progress of knowledge through science and the formulation of the rights of mankind within the context of that scientific knowledge. Natural Law Theory may also change as the traditional “master construct” of human nature is altered through scientific and technological intervention in human biology.

It might well take incalculable courage in these times of political correctness to reassess the basics of the Human Rights holy grail to determine whether essential biological facts have changed that might invoke the jurisprudential concept of rebus sic stantibus (particularly with respect to the various international human rights conventions, declarations, and treaties). Any change in facts could alter the definition and applicability of (1) what traditionally has been considered an immutable human nature; and (2) just what constitutes the genesis of a right inherent to all representatives of such an immutable nature.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the intensity and extent of the debate surrounding the issue of “human rights” and the impact of human genetic manipulation, cloning, stem cell research, and the like, on such rights will make for extraordinary difficulty in drafting relevant laws for such complex matters. The challenge will demand some very serious soul-searching by the global citizenry, as well as the experts in most scholarly disciplines, into transcendent values and the resolution of intensely competitive political interests. And then, finally, shall we have to deal equally as knowledgeably with growing assertions that certain entities presently categorized as artificial intelligence also have similar rights? Will the plant kingdom and the so-called lower orders of the animal kingdom have standing to sue for their own versions of such rights? Rebus sic stantibus!?

George S. Robinson, Editor

Return to COSMOS 2001 Table of Contents
Return to COSMOS Journals
Return to COSMOS Home Page